The outcome of the recent legislative elections has led many observers to firmly predict the end of the Kirchnerite era. However, the actual figures suggest that such a conclusive judgement is highly premature, and that the government, even after a harsh political defeat, still has its a chances, along with at least three other main coalitions, to battle through in 2015.
After a similar situation in 2009, most columnists (including myself) had thought in similar cycle-ending terms. Reality has proved how wrong we were, especially when incumbents reject death so firmly and grasp power so decisively. Why, then, run today into the same brick wall?
The official website of the last election shows an effort to hide that the government effectively suffered a political defeat, although the big numbers nationwide still show it as the first minority. That effort emerges on a chart presenting the results according to political affinities (http://www.resultados.gob.ar/resultados/99/DDN99999.htm). Thus, the Victory Front votes appear added to its “allies”, and likewise for the opposition forces. This statistical trickery nevertheless makes it easier for us to envisage the preliminary setting for 2015, which reveals a political map divided into at least four major coalitions: Kirchnerites (one-third of the national electorate on October 27), the pan-Radical/Socialist space (one-quarter), Sergio Massa’s allies (one-fifth), and Mauricio Macri’s Pro (around one-tenth).
This scenario is just a photograph of a legislative vote but is also the basis for the next campaign. It can change, of course, according to the next political and (no less important) economic developments, alongside the predictable polarization of every presidential campaign. Even if, for example, Massa and Macri converge (something which cannot be ruled out but is not at all easy) or if the former continues to seduce Peronists (like dissident CGT labour leader Hugo Moyano, abandoned by the government), it is difficult to imagine today a situation in which any of those groups could obtain a big enough majority to avoid a second round, that is 45% or, at least, 40% with a difference of 10 points over the runner-up, according to the constitutional text. The Kirchnerite hope of survival rests on this fact, which would lead to a run-off. But will they be able to retain at least their 2013 third of the vote in two years’ time?
The chances of Cristina Kirchner’s followers will depend on her ability to contain the possible exodus of provincial and municipal leaders to Massa’s Renewal Front. Speculations that the future seems sunnier near the always smiling Tigre mayor could seem persuasive but they all will need federal cash to arrive in good political shape to 2015 — their way out then may not prove so smooth.
That applies both to powerful Greater Buenos Aires mayors and provincial governors. Let us not forget, besides, that nine of the 13 Kirchnerite governors cannot be re-elected, which will force the President to draw up a complicated plan to contain most of them in electoral terms, in other words to involve them in the 2015 primaries.
One of those nine governors is already a presidential hopeful: Daniel Scioli. Although diminished after the Kirchnerite defeat in his own province, he repeated recently that, given the fact that there is no chance of a third term for Mrs. Kirchner, he will run in 2015. The governor maintains high popularity ratings, which in principle saves his aspirations.
Two other governors follow high on the list after their good results in Entre Ríos and Chaco: Sergio Urribarri and Jorge Capitanich. They are aware that their fate depends, of course, on the President’s choice but are publicly showing themselves eager to jump into any national cabinet reshuffle.. A dangerous game for them — to look too anxious could prematurely destroy their chances in the Kirchnerite jungle.
But the list is longer. José Alperovich (from Tucumán), accident-stricken José Luis Gioja (San Juan), Eduardo Fellner (Jujuy), Luis Beder Herrera (La Rioja), Francisco Pérez (Mendoza) and Oscar Jorge (La Pampa) have no future in their own territories, at least if they do not push through a constitutional reform. All of them, not to mention boosted Río Negro Senator Miguel Ángel Pichetto, could aspire to the second slot on a presidential ticket. The problem is that there is no room for everybody.
The precedent argument suggests that Mrs. Kirchner could feel forced to prioritize the current Peronist territorial power over her personal ideological tastes if she really wants to preserve her political capital and produce a succession. In short: the main mayors and governors over the young leaders of La Cámpora.
The chances of Capitanich or Urribarri appear minor in today comparison with those of Scioli; both would need a much higher profile in the future in order to become known to the public and competitive in eventual primaries. But a scheme aimed to contain a large number of governors could recreate a long historical Argentine tradition: the interior “governors’ league”, the “spell” (or curse) which has always deprived the Buenos Aires province strongman from reaching the Pink House. Something which might well correspond to Mrs. Kirchner’s wishes, given her well-known mistrust towards Scioli.
However, her real challenge to giving birth to an heir, beyond any political engineering, would be to remove the very obstacles which explained this year’s defeat: the rise of crime, inflation, currency restrictions, slumping international reserves, statistical lies, progressive decline in growth and job generation and daily transport miseries. If she at least shows signs of improvement in most of those areas, that possibility will be nearer.
If she succeeds in doing so, her chances of signalling an heir of her real preference would also be greater. If not, Scioli’s way to presenting himself as the post-Kirchnerite candidate would be paved. Her paradox emerges clear: Scioli may not be Mrs. Kirchner’s first choice but he is her best card she has to compete with Massa in the latter’s Buenos Aires province stronghold
Of course, the above game among the Peronist governors will determine “how Kirchnerite” an eventual successor would be. Pumping the domestic market yet further or an economy basically oriented to commodity exports? More or less protection for small and medium-sized industries? How would the tussle over income distribution be handled? How business-friendly or populist would economic policies be? How high and sharply would the dollar rise?
Every political era, especially when (as in this case) it will last for 12 years, the longest in modern Argentine history, is explained by its achievements and generates debts for the future. Kirchnerite’s debts include the items mentioned above, not at all minor, among others, such as a political style often seen as excessively aggressive. The way Mrs. Kirchner handles them in the short future will determine not only Argentina’s fate but also whether her husband’s and her own legacy will survive her last term in office.
Marcelo Falak 